confirmed fixes
18confirmed_fix
Likely remediation candidates after account-owner review confirms scope and rollout order.
scan
The first version focuses on AWS controls that repeatedly show up in SOC 2 and enterprise security reviews. The scan is a discovery tool, not an auto-remediation bot.
vishcore [scan]
client@discovery:~$ vishcore scan --target client-prod --mode read-only
→ No production changes during discovery
→ Control and recovery gaps grouped by severity and owner
→ Next step becomes a scoped remediation queue
vishcore [scan-scope]
It gives the first conversation a concrete surface: controls checked, gaps found, severity, and what should be remediated first.
~ $ vishcore scan --target client-prod --mode read-only
initial check set
OK s3.public_access_block
OK iam.root_mfa_enabled
GAP cloudtrail.multi_region_logging
OK rds.encryption_at_rest
GAP ec2.sg_open_ingress
summary: 3 ready, 2 gaps next: scoped remediation queue
Sample output for buyer review
Illustrative example based on the current Vishcore scanner report shape. The example is sanitized, client-safe, and not presented as a client endorsement.
Discovery uses read-only cloud metadata. It does not create, change, delete, remediate, or read secret values.
This is not an audit opinion, compliance certification, or guarantee that an environment will meet SOC 2 requirements.
confirmed_fix
Likely remediation candidates after account-owner review confirms scope and rollout order.
owner_context_needed
Findings where business intent, public exposure, monitoring ownership, or exception status must be confirmed first.
permission_limited
Controls held back by the default no-secret-read boundary or by scanner coverage limits.
The queue separates likely fixes from owner decisions, then ties each item to evidence Vishcore can collect after approved remediation.
Enable or confirm account and bucket-level Block Public Access where the owner confirms public access is not intended.
Evidence after fix: Follow-up scan shows S3 public access controls OK and references redacted API evidence hashes.
Confirm root MFA and rotate or retire stale active IAM access keys.
Evidence after fix: Follow-up scan shows root MFA OK and stale key findings cleared or documented as exceptions.
Remove broad ingress and egress rules from default security groups unless a documented exception exists.
Evidence after fix: Follow-up scan shows default security groups closed or owner-approved exceptions attached.
Decide whether the account joins vulnerability and security-finding workflows before enabling services.
Evidence after fix: Follow-up scan records service posture and remaining owner decisions.
Enable logging and alerting for production-facing load balancers; decide WAF scope for public endpoints.
Evidence after fix: Follow-up scan shows logging, alarm, and WAF posture by service-safe aliases.
These are not automatic failures. The account owner decides whether each posture is intended, a fix, an exception, or out of scope.
| Control | Why it matters | Owner input needed | Likely path |
|---|---|---|---|
| S3 bucket policy may allow public access | Some public access is intentional for static assets; accidental public access can expose data. | Which buckets are intended to be public, and which should be private? | Remove public policy statements unless approved for public content. |
| SSH ingress appears open to the world | World-open SSH increases account takeover and lateral-movement risk. | What administration path is approved for this account? | Restrict SSH to approved networks or replace direct SSH with the approved access path. |
| Security Hub enablement decision | Security Hub centralizes security findings and recurring review evidence. | Should this account join centralized security monitoring? | Enable Security Hub or document why the account is out of scope. |
| Security Hub standards decision | Security standards make findings repeatable, but can create noise without ownership. | Which standards are expected, and who owns triage? | Enable selected standards after agreeing on ownership and suppression rules. |
| Inspector EC2 coverage decision | Inspector helps identify vulnerable EC2 packages and exposed runtime risk. | Are EC2 instances in scope, and is Inspector cost/workflow approved? | Enable Inspector EC2 coverage or document why EC2 is not in scope. |
| Inspector Lambda coverage decision | Inspector can flag vulnerable Lambda package dependencies where Lambda is production-facing. | Are Lambda workloads in scope, and who reviews vulnerability findings? | Enable Inspector Lambda coverage for in-scope workloads. |
| Load balancer access logging decision | Access logs support incident response, traffic analysis, and evidence requests. | Which load balancers are production-facing and subject to retention requirements? | Enable access logs to an approved logging bucket for in-scope load balancers. |
| Load balancer alerting decision | Load balancer alarms catch degraded service before customers or reviewers ask for proof. | Who owns alert review, and are matching monitors already active? | Add AWS alarms or map to an approved monitoring system. |
| Public load balancer WAF decision | WAF can be appropriate for internet-facing applications, but scope depends on app risk. | Which public endpoints need WAF, and who accepts exceptions? | Attach WAF where useful or document why WAF is not needed for specific endpoints. |
| Managed credential rotation decision | Rotation reduces long-lived credential risk and strengthens access-control evidence. | Which stored credentials are production credentials, and can dependent systems rotate? | Enable rotation for production credentials where practical. |
| Managed credential KMS decision | Customer-managed KMS keys can improve ownership and separation-of-duties evidence. | Do credential stores require customer-managed keys, or are AWS-managed keys acceptable? | Move in-scope credential stores to customer-managed keys where the data boundary requires it. |
| ECS Container Insights decision | Container Insights improves operational visibility and incident evidence for ECS services. | Are ECS services production-like, and does current monitoring provide matching evidence? | Enable Container Insights for in-scope clusters or map to approved monitoring evidence. |
scan-check contract
See exactly what the public read-only checks validate, what they do not validate, and where the safety boundary sits.
The public sample shows the shape of the output. A real engagement still starts by confirming account access, scope, exclusions, and evidence needs.
See the full engagement flowbuyer questions
guardrail
Auto-remediation is intentionally deferred. The practical first product is a fast, readable control snapshot that creates a shared understanding before any production change.